{"id":25916,"date":"2022-07-29T12:26:00","date_gmt":"2022-07-29T10:26:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.criep.eu\/?p=25916"},"modified":"2022-07-29T12:32:28","modified_gmt":"2022-07-29T10:32:28","slug":"barbera-s-berga-d-moreno-b-nicolo-a-2022-pairwise-justifiable-changes-in-collective-choices-ssrn-3848685","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.criep.eu\/en\/barbera-s-berga-d-moreno-b-nicolo-a-2022-pairwise-justifiable-changes-in-collective-choices-ssrn-3848685\/","title":{"rendered":"Barber\u00e0 S.,\u00a0Berga D., Moreno B., Nicol\u00f2 A. (2022). Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices. SSRN 3848685."},"content":{"rendered":"

Barber\u00e0 S.,\u00a0Berga D., Moreno B., Nicol\u00f2 A.<\/a> (2022).<\/p>\n

Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices<\/strong>. SSRN 3848685<\/a>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Abstract:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. “If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from situation 1 to situation 2.” This principle requires a minimal justification for the fall of x in the consideration of society: someone must have decreased its appreciation relative to some other possible alternative. On appropriately restricted domains, pairwise justifiability, along with anonymity and neutrality, characterizes Condorcet consistent rules, thus providing a foundation for the choice of the alternatives that win by majority over all others in pairwise comparisons, when they exist.<\/p>\n

We study the consequences of imposing this requirement of pairwise justifiability on a large class of collective choice rules that includes social choice and social welfare functions as particular cases.<\/p>\n

When preference profiles are unrestricted, it implies dictatorship, and both Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorems become corollaries of our general result.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Barber\u00e0 S.,\u00a0Berga D., Moreno B., Nicol\u00f2 A. (2022). Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices. SSRN 3848685.   Abstract: Consider the following principle regarding the performance…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[2685,2684,2686,2682,2301,2683],"coauthors":[1525],"class_list":["post-25916","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-working-papers","tag-arrows-theorem","tag-condorcet-consistency","tag-gibbard-satterthwaites-theorem","tag-pairwise-justifiability","tag-social-choice-functions","tag-social-welfare-functions","category-34","description-off"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t