Pertile P., Levaggi R., Moretto M. (2014).

Two-part payments for the reimbursement of investments in health technologies. in Health Policy, vol. 115 (2), pp. 230-236

Abstract:

The paper studies the impact of alternative reimbursement systems on two provider decisions: whether to adopt a technology whose provision requires a sunk investment cost and how many patients to treat with it. Using a simple economic model we show that the optimal pricing policy involves a two-part payment: a price equal to the marginal cost of the patient whose benefit of treatment equals the cost of provision, and a separate payment for the partial reimbursement of capital costs. Departures from this scheme, which are frequent in DRG tariff systems designed around the world, lead to a trade-off between the objective of making effective technologies available to patients and the need to ensure appropriateness in use.