In a dynamic adverse selection setting with private information about stochastic consumer preferences, we study the pricing of franchise rights when the awarding government body has to balance between revenue collection and consumer welfare. In this environment, we show that optimal pricing requires an appropriate combination of fixed and time-variable transfers between the parties. Notably, our findings suggest that it might be optimal to occasionally subsidize rather than charge the franchisee when consumers’ willingness to pay increases well beyond initial expectations.

Marco Buso
https://sites.google.com/site/busomarco/Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali “Marco Fanno”, Università degli Studi di Padova Ricercatore

Cesare Dosi
http://www.unipd.it/scheda-personale?key=211BCF3C4B9FE8C6A3F99B6B5FADA97DDipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali “Marco Fanno”, Università degli Studi di Padova Professore Ordinario

Michele Moretto
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michele-MorettoI am currently Professor of Economics at the University of Padova.